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and the EU in the UN  
 
Abstract1 
 
 
Structural change brought about by the end of the Cold War and accelerated globalization have 
transformed the global environment. A global governance complex is emerging, characterized by an 
ever greater functional and regulatory role for multilateral organizations such as the UN and its 
associated agencies. The evolving global governance framework has created opportunities for regional 
organizations to participate as actors within the UN (and other multilateral institutions).  
This article compares the EU and ASEAN as actors within the UN network. It begins by extrapolating 
framework conditions for the emergence of EU and ASEAN actorness from the literature. The core 
argument of this article is that EU and ASEAN actorness is evolving in two succinct stages: Changes in 
the global environment create opportunities for the participation of regional organizations in global 
governance institutions, exposing representation and cohesion problems at the regional level. In 
response, ASEAN and the EU have initiated processes of institutional adaptation. 
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Introduction 
 
Regional organizations are emerging as actors in their own right within global 
governance institutions. The EU is by far the most advanced case of regionalism2 and 
has a long tradition of developing actor capabilities and external foreign policies. 
ASEAN too has a long tradition of relations with external actors and global 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN). Based on the literatures on global 
                                                 
1 The author wishes to thank Prof. John Gaffney, Dr. Meera Warrier and Dr. Bart Gaens for comments 
on earlier drafts of this paper. 
2 Regionalism here is defined as a deliberate strategy cumulating in the creation of institutional and 
organizational structures at the macro-regional level (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002: 34). 
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transformation, EU actorness and new regionalism, this article extrapolates an 
analytical framework to compare the EU and ASEAN as international actors within 
multilateral organizations. It suggests that the actorness of the EU and ASEAN within 
international organizations depends on the international context (structural factors 
enabling the participation and recognition of the EU and ASEAN in multilateral 
organizations) and regional institutionalization (determining representation, cohesion 
and capabilities). In recent years, the EU and ASEAN have undertaken institutional 
reforms, partly driven by the desire to become more relevant as actors within global 
governance. The article argues that the emergence of regional organizations as actors 
is part of a double movement, with enhanced institutionalization being the response to 
structural changes in the international context. The form and direction of 
institutionalization, however, is largely determined by historical factors and normative 
priorities.  
 
The EU and ASEAN in global governance institutions: the conceptual 
framework 
 
The distinction between old and new regionalism as empirical phenomena and as 
competing analytical approaches is by now well established in the literature.3 
European integration theory, in particular neofunctionalism, has been the pinnacle of 
old regionalism theorizing. New regionalism scholars seek inspiration from global 
political economy and social theory (see Hettne 2003, Hettne and Söderbaum 2008). 
A very special position is held by the Gothenburg School, which employs a dialectical 
understanding of regionalism and globalization associated with Polanyi (see 
                                                 
3 For more see Hettne (1996). 
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Söderbaum and Sbragia 2010). Regionalism is part of a double movement with 
neoliberal/ open regionalism representing the first movement and regulatory/ 
interventionist/ protectionist/ developmental regionalism the second movement. The 
first movement supports neoliberal globalization processes; the second can be seen as 
a societal, political response to the various problems linked to neoliberal 
globalization. Resistance to mounting inequalities and hardships imposed by 
economic globalization leads to new forms of regulation and social welfare 
institutions. One may take protests addressing global and regional issues such as, for 
instance, widespread unrest in Greece following the severe budget cuts and tax rises 
and the global spread of the ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement to cities across the world 
as the first part of the second movement, eventually leading to regional discourses on 
how to better regulate global forces. 
 
In more general terms, new regionalism scholarship seeks to understand how regions 
are constructed and reconstructed, why and how state- and non-state actors come 
together in formal and informal regional settings in the context of globalization. One 
example is the literature on regional actorness, here defined as the emergence of 
regional organizations as subjects and actors in their own right within the global 
governance framework. Two sets of key questions can be asked. Can regional 
organizations truly become relevant actors at the global level? What are enabling/ 
constraining conditions? 
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The idea that regions can emerge as actors has a long history. Much of this work 
focuses on the EC/ EU.4 This literature has highlighted several issues. First, there is 
an underlying emphasis on institutional development as enhancing the visibility, 
capacity and effectiveness of EU actorness. Institutions are widely understood as sets 
of formal and informal norms, rules and principles (Kjær 2004: 8). They forge certain 
types of behavior and instill particular values and cultures, providing the EU with 
presence and identity at the international level. They are the key to the EU’s 
international capacity, and institutional deficiencies are behind the capability-
expectations gap identified by Christopher Hill (1993). Sjöstedt (1977: 15-16) 
emphasizes the importance of internal cohesion and capacity which requires certain 
institutional prerequisites. In a similar vein, Hill (1993: 15) outlines specific 
institutional qualifications that enhance actor capacity such as a legal personality, 
negotiation capacity, resources and instruments.5 
 
Some authors, notably Allen and Smith (1991, 1998) have focused on the concept of 
international presence. Yet presence alone, i.e. economic and geopolitical footprint, is 
insufficient to transform a regional organization from an object into an active subject. 
This requires purposive action, which in turn is dependent on institutionalization. 
Presence, however, does point us in the direction of representation, recognition and 
autonomy (see Jupille and Caporaso 1998 and Bretherton and Vogler 1999).  Another 
recurring theme is the focus on actor capability providing the ability for purposive 
action. Sjöstedt (1977:16) defined actorness as the ‘capacity to behave actively and 
                                                 
4 Examples include the works of Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977), David Allen and Michael Smith (1991, 
1998), Christopher Hill (1993), Antje Herrberg (1997), Joseph Jupille and James Caporaso (1998), 
Richard Whitman (1998), Ian Manners (2002), Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (1999). 
5 References to the link between institutions and actor effectiveness can also be found in Jupille and 
Carporaso (1998) and in Bretherton and Vogler (1999).  
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deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’, also echoed by 
Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 20).  
 
New regionalism scholars like Hettne (1996, 2003, 2010 and 2011) often draw on 
European Studies to describe the formation of regional actor identities. Hettne 
describes institutionalization in terms of levels of regioness - a process whereby a 
region emerges as an acting subject with a distinct identity, capability, legitimacy and 
decision-making structure by enhancing institutional and regional cohesion (Hettne 
1996, 2003, Hettne and Söderbaum 2002). Mathew Doidge (2008: 38, 39) identifies 
action triggers (goals, interests and principles as well as emerging situations requiring 
a response), policy structures (ability to take decisions) and performance structures 
(capabilities and resources) as prerequisites for regional actorness.6  
 
Internal cohesion, decision-making structures and representation in global governance 
institutions are ultimately dependent on institutional structures. It is helpful to evoke a 
spectrum of institutionalization ranging from the informal/ intergovernmental to 
formal/ legal/ supranational institutions. The position of an organization along this 
continuum determines to a large degree its effectiveness in international affairs 
(Doidge 2008: 42). Informal institutionalization, characterized by a preference for 
informal arrangements premised on convention and mutual understanding rather than 
formal rules, sets clear limits for potential actorness. Decision-making under such 
circumstances is drawn out, limited and prone to inefficiency. Unanimity procedures, 
for example, are arduous and time consuming (Lister 1984: 11-14). Consensus 
procedures allow for majority voting but allow a minority to block any decision not 
                                                 
6 See also Hettne on actorship (2007, 2011: 28). 
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acceptable to them (Rittberger and Zangl 2006: 68). The capacity to act and the 
capabilities at the disposal of the actor are limited and decisions are often deemed as 
non-binding. In contrast, more formalized institutionalization enhances internal 
cohesion and representation in international affairs. Decision-making procedures will 
typically be very complex, based on strong legal foundations, follow some form of 
majority voting, creating legally binding outcomes, clearly demarcating external 
capabilities. Institutionalization, therefore, impacts on the international actorness of 
regional organizations in three ways: First, it determines issues of representation. 
Second, it influences internal cohesion through a culture of rules, norms and 
compliance mechanisms. And third, it defines decision-making processes and the 
articulation of collective interests. 
 
Much of the current literature on new regionalism strongly focuses on the linkages 
between regionalism and globalization and structural change (Hettne 1996, 2002, 
2010, 2011, Söderbaum and Sbragia 2010: 568). Since the 1990s, the exogenous 
dimension has received more attention within European Studies too (Hill and Smith 
2005, Telò 2005 and 2009, Wunderlich and Bailey 2011).  Various authors point to 
the importance of external factors in the construction of regional actorness (see 
Bretherton and Vogler 1999 and Hettne 1996, 2002, 2010, 2011, Doidge 2008). Based 
on this, we can extrapolate that the emergence of regional organizations as actors in 
global governance institutions depends on the interplay of exogenous and endogenous 
factors: (a) developments in the external environment and (b) regional 
institutionalization. Indeed, new regionalism scholars strongly maintain that 
globalization and structural change trigger regional developments (Söderbaum and 
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Sbragia 2010). In this way, regional actorness emerges as an institutional response to 
changes in the external environment. 
 
The external context: globalization and global governance 
 
The broader global political constellation emerges as a structural factor determining 
and shaping the relevance of the EU and ASEAN within global governance 
institutions (Jørgensen et al 2011: 614-15). Formal and informal rules and procedures 
of global governance institutions frame the significance of EU and ASEAN 
participation as actors. For instance, by not providing for membership of regional 
organizations, the UN Security Council constrains the options of recognition and 
representation of the EU and ASEAN. The global governance framework, therefore, 
conditions the participation of regional organizations.  
 
Much has been written on the impact of globalization on transforming global 
governance. There are several recurring themes in the multiple definitions of 
globalization such as enhanced cross-border flows, accelerating transaction speeds, 
the shrinking of time and space as constraining factors and increasing integration, 
interconnectivity and interdependence (see Ritzer 2007: 1).7 The transformalist 
globalization literature (see Scholte 2000, Held et al. 1999, Held and McGrew 2002, 
Rosenau 2003 and 2005) maintains the position that contemporary globalization is 
distinct from previous periods, involving more than the intensification of economic 
exchanges. Globalization is operating across several domains, including the economic 
but also the cultural, the political and the social. Increasingly, all societies are facing 
similar problems such as boundary control, financial crises and global warming. The 
                                                 
7 See also Scholte (2000: 46), Held (1997: 3) and Giddens (1990: 64). 
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separation between domestic and international spheres for policy and governance 
purposes becomes increasingly difficult (McGrew 2007: 36). 
 
The broad structural consequences of globalization have implications for global 
governance (see Koenig-Archibugi 2007: 46-47). The transformalist global 
governance literature rejects state-centric conceptions of geopolitics. Its analytical 
core is a concern with understanding and explaining global, regional and transnational 
structures of regulatory decision-making and implementation (Held and McGrew 
2007: 9). The creation and maintenance of institutions at the local, the regional and 
global level is, therefore, associated with the management of globalization (see 
Krasner 1983, Keohane 1984, Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, Young 1989, 1999 and 
2005, Rosenau 2003 and 2005). The focus is on the evolving system of political and 
economic coordination reaching across multiple levels from the local to the global. 
This is an evolving multi-actor system where public and private actors seek to realize 
common purposes and resolve collective action problems. In short, the transformalist 
literature on globalization and global governance maintains that we are witnessing the 
transformation of world politics away from state- and security-centered geopolitics to 
a complex relocation and dispersion of authority between various layers of regulatory 
decision-making.  
 
The organizing principle of this global governance system is multilateralism (Thakur 
and Van Langenhove 2008: 22). The international institution that has become 
synonymous with multilateralism is the UN system and its related agencies. The UN 
Charter retains the possibility for the UN to establish partnerships with regional 
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organizations (UN Charter, Chapter VIII).8 The end of the Cold War released the UN 
from the straightjacket of superpower conflict. Acceleration of globalization and the 
growth in regionalism worldwide have led to a significant increase in UN interactions 
with regional organizations. In 1992, the UN General Secretary’s Report, ‘An Agenda 
for Peace’, called for greater cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements 
and organizations (see UN Secretary General 1992, VII). Throughout the last two 
decades the UN worked gradually to deepen its contacts with regional organizations. 
Several regional organizations, such as the African Union and the Arab League, now 
have the status of permanent observers at the General Assembly. Beginning in 1993, 
the UN General Assembly convened several high-level meetings with regional 
organizations to discuss global challenges (Thakur and Van Langenhove 2006: 236). 
Following the first high-level meeting between the UN and regional organizations, the 
General Assembly adopted the Declaration of Enhancement of Cooperation between 
the UN and Regional Organizations in the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security (UN General Assembly 1995). 
 
In 2005, the formalization of relations between the UN and regional organizations 
reached an entirely new level following several commitments at the World Summit, 
the sixth high-level meeting between the UN and regional organizations and the 
Security Council (UN General Assembly 2005; UN Secretary General 2005; UN 
Security Council 2005). There is explicit support for a stronger relationship between 
the UN and regional organizations through formalized agreements and, where 
appropriate, involvement of regional organizations in the Security Council. An 
important step in this direction was the 2010 debate of the Security Council on 
                                                 
8 See also Van Langenhove (2011: 94). 
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cooperation with regional organizations on international peace and security matters 
(UN Security Council 2010). 
 
The challenges of globalization and post-Cold War restructuring have created 
opportunities for regional organizations to participate in global governance within the 
UN alongside states. This raises the question as to whether regional actors such as the 
EU and ASEAN have the necessary capacities to effectively operate within the UN 
system, bringing us right to the core of regional actorness and the second part of this 
article: institutionalization of regional organizations. 
 
The internal context: institutionalization and regional actorness 
 
The literature for analyzing the behavior of the EU within the UN framework tends to 
be sparse, diffuse and is scattered across a variety of perspectives and issue areas in 
International Relations (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, Laatikainen and Smith 2006, 
Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011, Koutrakou 2011). The Treaty on European Union 
(1993) incorporated EU foreign and security policy coordination into the treaty 
framework. EU external policy-making is divided between the Community and Union 
methods. Community policy-making refers to the competencies of the European 
Community (EC), encapsulated in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and other 
parts of the Treaty of Rome, dealing with the negotiation and conclusion of 
international agreements. The Commission is initiator of most legislation proposals 
which have to be passed by the Council of Ministers by qualified majority voting and 
be approved by the European Parliament. This pillar is clearly supranational. Union 
policy-making, on the other hand, is the mode of decision-making for common 
 12
foreign and security affairs consisting of the extensive coordination of national 
policies among member-states (Smith, 1996: 258). European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) and its successor the Common Foreign and Security Polity (CFSP) and 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), are two examples. The European 
Council, composed of the heads of state, sets broad guidelines; the Council of 
Ministers takes decisions to implement them (Farrell 2006: 29).  
 
The external role of the EU evolved from the 1990s to 2011 as a response to structural 
change and globalization. The EU has emerged as a very important partner for the UN 
across a broad range of areas such as development, climate change, peace-building, 
humanitarian assistance, health concerns and the promotion of good governance. Like 
the UN, the EU is committed to multilateralism. The EU (and its member-states) is 
also amongst the biggest contributors to the UN budget (see Koutrakou 2011: 211). 
However, there are also serious questions regarding external representation, internal 
cohesion and consistency. 
 
The persona of the EU within the UN is a complicated matter. The EU is indirectly 
represented via its own member states. As such, it is ‘represented’ even within the 
Security Council where two EU member states, France and the United Kingdom, hold 
permanent seats and veto powers. As an organization the EU has only permanent 
observer status in the General Assembly.9 However, in May 2011 the UN General 
Assembly upgraded the status of the EU by adopting a resolution granting the EU the 
right to reply and the ability to make oral amendments (UN General Assembly 2011). 
The EU now has its own voice within the UN General Assembly. Further 
                                                 
9 It is a full member of the Food and Agricultural Organization only (see Taylor 2006: 135). 
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complicating the EU representation issue are the different Commissioners (External 
Relations, Development and Aid), Directorates-General, the High Representative, 
various European Parliament and other Committees, the Presidency and the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (Koutrakou 2011: 213).  
 
The organizational and institutional structure is responsible for a capability-
expectations gap the EU suffers within the UN (and in its external relations in 
general). Given its size, potential and its normative priorities, the EU might be 
expected to be a ‘leader’ or ‘frontrunner’ within the UN on, for instance, human rights 
issues.10 However, as Taylor (2006) found, this is far from being the case. The EU is 
more often responsive than being proactive. Its organizational structure implies that 
the EU often lacks internal cohesion, with individual member-states but also different 
EU institutions following their own agendas. The EU may appear to constitute a 
single actor. Yet, in reality it masks a diversity of different actors with individual 
interests and opinions. Different countries often support different positions. For 
example, the dispute between the EU and China in 2005 over textile imports revealed 
differences within the EU; with Britain, Germany and the Nordic countries supporting 
freer trade and Spain, France and Italy seeking to limit imports (Breslin 2010: 6). 
There are also differences at the institutional level with the Parliament, the 
Commission and different Directorate-Generals having different positions (Breslin 
2010: 7). Hence, the EU is forced to spend a great amount of time and energy on 
internal coordination in order to arrive at a common foreign policy position.  
 
                                                 
10 See Manners (2002) on the concept of normative power Europe. 
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In the past, there has been no set of common objectives guiding EU external action. 
EU external policies are scattered across different institutions and treaties. For 
example, Title V of the Treaty on European Union contained the provisions on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy while the EC Treaty covered trade policy, 
development aid and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third 
countries. Therefore, the EU’s external relations with global governance institutions 
such as the UN are governed by different rules and different sets of decision-makers.  
 
 Already in 1993, Christopher Hill identified a capability-expectations gap while 
analyzing the emerging external role of the European Community, created by 
expectations and the limitations in capacity, capability and cohesion.11 Various treaty 
revisions, such as the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty, have attempted, among other 
things, to address issues of institutional representation and coherence/ consistency in 
the EU’s external policies. The Lisbon Treaty is the latest and most far-reaching in 
this line. It has removed the pillar structure introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union and conferred a single legal personality upon the EU (TEU 2010, Art. 47).12 
This enhances the EU’s visibility within global governance institutions such as the 
UN. The Lisbon Treaty further improves the effectiveness of the EU as an actor by 
addressing the problems of consistency, coherence and representation. It contains a 
set of common principles and objectives aimed at EU external policies. Of particular 
importance is Article 21 (2) which defines eight common external objectives with the 
aim to enhance the EU’s cohesion and consistency. The theme of consistency is also 
addressed in Article 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU): ‘The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, 
                                                 
11 See also Hill (1998). 
12 Until the Lisbon Treaty, the EC was endowed with legal personality while the EU as a whole was 
not. 
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taking all its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral 
of powers’ (TFEU 2010, Art. 7).  
 
Qualified majority voting in the Council has been extended to new policy areas in 
order to make decision-making faster and more efficient. The institutional framework 
has been streamlined to improve the coherence of the EU’s external actions. The 
position of a President of the European Council has been introduced, thereby 
providing this institution with a face. More important is the creation of a dedicated 
External Action Service bridging the different components of EU external policy and 
the post of High Representative for the Union in Foreign and Security Affairs. 
Following Article 21(3) TEU (2010) the Council together with the Commission, 
assisted by the High Representative, are responsible for ensuring consistency of the 
Union’s external policies. The High Representative has a crucial coordinating 
function: she is also Vice President of the Commission.13 She has the right to 
formulate and to submit proposals for action to the European Council. She chairs the 
Foreign Affairs Council and represents the EU abroad. The Commission now 
represents the EU in all matters except common foreign and security policy, which is 
done by the High Representative.  
 
ASEAN has followed a very different trajectory of regional integration. In contrast to 
the EU’s preference for the formal and legal, ASEAN has pursued what one observer 
has described as a ‘relations-based approach’ (Davidson 2009: 28). Where the EU is a 
hybrid creature combining intergovernmental decision-making with supranational 
features, ASEAN decision-making structures remain firmly intergovernmental. 
                                                 
13 In 2010, Catherine Ashton was appointed the first High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
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Several authors have sought to explain these differences between European 
integration and Southeast Asian regionalism in terms of historical, geo-political, 
social and cultural differences.14 ASEAN’s raison d’être was primarily state-building 
through peaceful and progressive economic development, promoting social stability 
within national boundaries, and through freedom from external interference (Peou 
1998: 447). Observers such as Acharya (2001), Khoo (2000) and Alagappa (1993) 
have likened ASEAN regionalism to the construction of a regional security 
community or a ‘neighborhood watch group’. ASEAN was about regional re-
assurance and enhancing regional trust and confidence-building via the opening of 
new channels of communication (Henderson 1999). By creating ASEAN, Southeast 
Asia’s newly independent states provided themselves with a stable structure to deal 
with intraregional relations, contain intraregional conflict, resist external influence 
and position themselves within the Cold War (see Caballero-Anthony 2003: 5; Stubbs 
2008, Sukma 1999:41). 
 
Much has been written about ASEAN’s informal regionalism (see Kivimäki 2010: 
433). This does not mean, however, that ASEAN has no institutional structure. In fact, 
numerous institutionalized meetings are included under the ASEAN umbrella, such as 
the ASEAN summits, the annual and ad-hoc meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers, 
the meetings of ASEAN economic ministers, meetings of other ministers and senior 
officials and expert groups (Caballero-Anthony 2009: 38). These meetings and the 
various ASEAN declarations and agreements have created a comprehensive 
framework for managing intra-regional relations. ASEAN diplomacy makes use of 
informal and non-official relationships and discussions to work out consensual 
                                                 
14 See Katzenstein (1996) and Wunderlich (2007). 
 17
positions behind the scenes, rather than employing lengthy intergovernmental 
conferences. This has helped to establish dense networks of government officials and 
diplomats who negotiate ‘on the golf course’ (Bellamy 2004: 170). In addition, 
ASEAN makes intensive use of ‘track-two diplomacy’ (Capie 2010). These unofficial 
yet officially acknowledged meetings between academic institutions and think tanks 
serve important functions of allowing discussion in ‘informal’ but often 
institutionalized settings (Freistein 2008: 224).  
 
The ASEAN way evolved as the institutional core of the Association. At its heart are 
procedural norms such convention, voluntarism and informal agreement. This is 
encapsulated in the concepts of musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus) 
(Nischalke 2002: 93). The consensus model is the center-piece of ASEAN decision-
making. It is a process leading to collective action ensuring that ‘each and every 
action taken in the name of ASEAN must either contribute to or be neutral, but not 
detract from, the perceived national interests of individual ASEAN member states’ 
(Kurus 1994: 405). The consensus procedure does not imply unanimity. A consensus 
is reached when no ASEAN state explicitly objects to a particular initiative.   
 
Within the UN, ASEAN is represented by its member states who found ways to 
cooperate within the UN and, by acting collectively, enhance the visibility of the 
grouping. An early example was the response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 
1979, an episode that was crucial for the evolution of ASEAN as a regional collective 
actor and agenda-setter within the UN (Rüland 2011: 102). ASEAN’s coordinated 
efforts within the UN made it impossible for Vietnam to gain access to international 
capital and aid from many key donors and international agencies (Loder et al. 2011: 
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82).  ASEAN members supported a coherent corporate position for more than a 
decade and its international weight increased significantly together with its profile and 
influence (Narine 2008: 417, Morada 2008: 37, Acharya 2001).  
  
UN cooperation with ASEAN focused traditionally on development issues and dates 
back to 1972 and the first agreements on cooperation between ASEAN and UN 
agencies, funds and programs. Since 1977, the UNDP has been an ASEAN dialogue 
partner and was the only non-state actor to be one until 2009. In the post-Cold War 
world, ASEAN began to move away from a focus on regional peace and stability to 
explore ‘broader regional co-ordination in a substantial number of economic issues, as 
well as so-called functional areas that addressed particular microeconomic and social 
issues’ (De Prado 2010: 362). ASEAN member states realized the advantages of 
operating as a group and were determined to enhance ASEAN as a functioning 
regional organization (Weatherbee 2005: 95-100).  
 
Like the EU, ASEAN has increasingly opened its proceedings to other institutions and 
developed links with other countries and international organizations. Examples are its 
involvement in APEC, the ARF, the Asia-Europe Meeting or the ASEAN Plus 
process. At the same time, ASEAN enhanced its involvement in institutions of global 
governance. In 2006 ASEAN became an observer in the General Assembly (UN 
General Assembly 2006).  
 
On 25 September 2007, the Secretaries-General of the UN and ASEAN signed a 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MOU) on the future of UN-ASEAN cooperation 
(ASEAN 2007a). Among other things, this MOU called ‘to make appropriate 
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administrative arrangements to ensure effective co-operation and liaison between the 
two Secretariats’. The latest UN-ASEAN Summit took place in 2010 (ASEAN 2010). 
A relatively dense network of institutional cooperation between the UN, its several 
associated agencies (such as UNDP, FAO, ESCAP) and ASEAN has evolved since 
the end of the Cold War. The UN has also organized two peace-keeping operations in 
the region: one in Cambodia and, more recently, in East Timor. These operations were 
supported by several ASEAN members. Indeed, Malaysia and Indonesia have 
regularly contributed to UN peacekeeping missions around the world.  
 
ASEAN too faces a representation problem in the UN and in other global governance 
institutions. In ASEAN’s case, this problem has been perpetuated by its weak 
organizational capacity. Indeed, until 2006, while having forged links with UN 
agencies and related bodies such as ESCAP and the UNDP, ASEAN has been the 
only major regional organization without observer status in the UN (ASEAN 2006). 
In terms of staff levels, administrative and research support and financial resources 
ASEAN stands in stark contrast to the EU. The ASEAN Secretariat has a staff of 60 
officers recruited from the ASEAN member-states and 150 more support staff 
recruited locally (ESCAP 2008: 14). The ASEAN Secretariat has no executive and 
legislative powers comparable to the Commission, aiming exclusively for ‘greater 
efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN organs and for more effective 
implementation of ASEAN projects and activities’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2009). 
 
ASEAN’s budget too is extremely modest. ASEAN members contribute $ 1.4 million 
per country and annum to the maintenance of the ASEAN Secretariat (see Rüland 
2011: 100). This is symptomatic of ASEAN’s decentralized model of regionalism. It 
 20
confirms the state-centric nature of ASEAN. The ASEAN states’ pursuit of 
independence and defense of sovereignty has also been underlined by the consensus 
and accommodation procedures. There are no formal rules by which ASEAN 
members must abide or by which non-compliance can be punished (Peou 1998: 448). 
The definition of ‘ASEAN’ interests, therefore, remains the preserve of ASEAN 
governments. ASEAN’s ability to achieve collective action is constrained by state 
sovereignty. This left the Association unable to respond to the transnational 
challenges of the 1990s such as the Asian financial crisis and the haze, the East Timor 
crisis, the increased threat of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, the spread of infectious 
diseases (such as SARS and avian flu), piracy, and illegal migration (see Asciutti 
2010: 48). ASEAN was heavily criticized and its credibility was dented (see, for 
example, Henderson 1999). Yet, this capability-expectations gap is also an indicator 
of ASEAN’s presence in global affairs which is not matched by regional cohesion.  
 
ASEAN’s continuing problem is institutional: The ASEAN Way based on non-
interference has become incompatible with being an effective regional organization. 
ASEAN members find it very difficult to overcome this problem (Haacke 2003: 165-
90, Freistein 2005: 182). ASEAN member states’ ability to control territory, people 
and resources within national boundaries remains weak. This lack of unconditional 
political legitimacy explains the continuing emphasis on sovereignty and non-
interference in the region. ASEAN’s main purpose remains to support Southeast 
Asia’s state-building projects in the face of the multiple challenges of globalization 
and structural change. The institutional response came in 2003 with the ASEAN 
Community (ASEAN 2003, Morada 2008: 40). The ASEAN Charter, a step to 
achieve the ASEAN Community, aims to ensure the global relevance of ASEAN 
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through institutional consolidation (Ba 2009: 362). It is interesting to note that there 
are certain parallels between the Lisbon Treaty and the ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN 
Charter represents ‘what could have been a lean version of the Constitutional Treaty’ 
(Börzel and Risse 2009: 13). According to former ASEAN Secretary-General Ong 
Keng Yong, the Charter aims to confirm ASEAN as an organization by conferring 
legal personality, enhancing institutional accountability and compliance and 
reinforcing the perception of ASEAN as a serious regional actor (ASEAN 2007b). 
Article 3 of the Charter makes ASEAN a subject of international law by establishing 
legal personality, allowing ASEAN to enter into transactions in its own right. This 
aims to strengthen ASEAN’s perception as a player in the international arena. The 
Charter further defines the institutional structure of ASEAN: Article 7 substantiates 
the ASEAN Summit as the supreme policy-making body. ASEAN decision-making 
remains firmly intergovernmental, based on consultation and consensus (ASEAN 
2007c: Art. 20 (1)). Article 11 deals with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the 
ASEAN Secretariat. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of 
ASEAN and will ‘represent the views of ASEAN and participate in meetings with 
external parties in accordance with approved policy guidelines and mandate given’ 
(ASEAN 2007c: Art. 11 (2b)). As for decision-making, the Charter enshrines the 
ASEAN Way of consultation and consensus (ASEAN 2007c: Art. 20). 
 
Chapter XII is of particular interest for ASEAN’s participation as an actor within the 
UN system as it deals with external relations. Article 41(4) reemphasizes the necessity 
to coordinate foreign policy among ASEAN members to develop ‘common positions 
and pursue joint actions’. Responsible for this is the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting (ASEAN 2007c: Art. 41 (6)). The ASEAN member state acting as country 
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coordinator will be responsible for coordinating ASEAN’s relations with external 
partners and international organizations (ASEAN 2007c: Art. 42(1)). Thus, the 
country coordinator will represent ASEAN as a group within the UN. In sum, the 
ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community can be regarded as a tightening of 
ASEAN’s institutionalization in response to the challenges posed by globalization and 
multilevel global governance.  
 
Analysis and concluding remarks 
 
This article has argued that regional organizations such as the EU and ASEAN are 
evolving as actors within the multilevel global governance framework as the result of 
a two-stage process: First, structural change has accelerated the spread and reach of 
economic globalization transforming global governance. Global multilateral 
organizations, like the UN, have increased in functional width and depth. Regional 
organizations such as the EU and ASEAN aim to enhance their influence and 
recognition within global governance institutions such as the UN. However, regional 
organizations are by no means fully-fledged foreign policy actors, restricting 
operation within the UN (De Prado 2010: 368). 
 
Institutional adaptation constitutes the second part of this process. Enhanced 
opportunities to participate within global governance institutions such as the UN 
helped to highlight institutional deficits with respect to representation and cohesion. 
These issues are ultimately rooted in the institutional design that frames 
representation, capacity and cohesion. The EU has aimed to address these issues in 
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various treaty reforms, the Lisbon Treaty being the latest. We can observe similar 
trends within ASEAN and the ASEAN Charter.  
 
However, those who expect a convergence of regionalism around EU-style 
institutionalization will be disappointed. ASEAN appears to be moving towards a 
more institutionalized structure but by no means does it endorse the formal, legal and 
interventionist model promoted by the EU. The fundamental differences between the 
EU and ASEAN will remain. While the ASEAN Charter may look at the surface 
comparable to a light version of the Lisbon Treaty, it also enshrines the ASEAN Way 
with its emphasis on non-intervention. ASEAN has developed a unique set of norms 
and institutions that are distinct from the EU model. Ultimately, ASEAN’s 
institutional and normative culture it rooted in Southeast Asian history and culture.15 
The same is true for European integration. Historical institutionalism makes the point 
that core norms and beliefs, once enshrined in the institutional set-up of an 
organization, tend to be resistant to change. Contemporary institutional choices are, 
therefore, framed by historical norms that have become a baseline for further 
developments (see Pierson 1998 and Stubbs 2008). 
 
EU norms and the EU’s self-understanding is constructed on broad liberal values such 
as adherence to political and individual human rights, democracy as the only 
acceptable form of government and the rule of law as the organizing principle. The 
EU strongly identifies with these principles and promotes them in its external 
relations (see de Prado 2010: 269). This informs EU institutions, its policies, its 
approach to global governance and its actorness. Normative power scholars tend to 
                                                 
15 See Kim (2009). 
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argue that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis but it is also 
predisposed to act in a normative way in world politics (Manners 2002: 42). As such, 
the EU regards itself as a norm promoter in global governance, as the standard case of 
successful regional integration and as an alternative world order model to US 
hegemony (see Hettne 2007).  
 
ASEAN is constructed on very different normative principles. Indeed, as Stubbs 
(2008: 452) argued, ASEAN has emerged as an alternative to the EU approach to 
global and regional order which promotes institutions with the capacity to intervene to 
promote stability, order and human rights (Stubbs 208: 452). The EU approach to 
regional and global governance places a premium on formal negotiations and deep 
institutions and the rule of law (Stubbs 2008: 452). ASEAN’s core norms, as 
expressed in the ASEAN Way, stress neutrality, territorial integrity and non-
interference and consensus-based decision-making. These principles provide for 
ASEAN’s meta-regime which underlies ASEAN’s institutional development (see 
Aggarwal and Chow 2010). ASEAN’s normative meta-regime remains at the heart of 
the Association’s self-understanding. It has been enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. 
Far from waning, the ASEAN approach may potentially emerge as an alternative 
model for regional integration and for global governance (see Stubbs 2008). It appeals 
to developmental states such as China and India and may be of particular relevance at 
a time when the EU is locked in a deep crisis.  
 
There is no single model of regionalism and regional actorness. The EU and ASEAN 
share similar goals in global governance: ensuring continuing relevance in the face of 
enhanced globalization and greater recognition. Kim (2009: 296) points to ‘procedural 
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divergence’, whereby different paths for regionalism exist, depending on regional 
idiosyncrasies. The principle of non-intervention has been challenged in recent years 
but it has not been abandoned. The rationale for ASEAN’s genesis was to support 
state-building processes within Southeast Asia. The ASEAN 10 remain 
developmental states driven by the desire to create a functioning state-system 
(Weatherbee 2005). What has changed is the external environment that regional 
organizations such as ASEAN and the EU are embedded in. ASEAN members have 
responded to these changes in order to create a better functioning regional 
organization that helps to fulfill their interests. Yet, non-intervention and respect for 
sovereignty will remain at the core of ASEAN’s approach to regionalism and regional 
actorness. It has become a cornerstone for ASEAN’s evolving identity. This illustrates 
once again that regionalism is, after all, a highly endogenous process and regional 
institution-building is shaped not only by global dynamics but first and foremost by 
socio-economic, cultural, political and historical forces that are local and create a 
certain path-dependency. 
 26
References 
 
Acharya, A. (2001) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the 
Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routledge). 
Aggarwal, V.K. and Chow, J.T. (2010) ‘The Perils of Consensus: How ASEAN’s Meta-
Regime undermines Economic and Environmental Cooperation’, in Review of 
International Political Economy, vol. 17, no. 2. 
Alagappa, M. (1993) ‘Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodia 
Conflict’, in Journal of International Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2. 
Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1991) ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary 
International Arena’, in Holland, M. (ed.) The Future of European Political 
Cooperation (New York: St. Martin’s Press). 
Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1998) ‘The European Union’s Security Presence: Barrier, 
Facilitator or Manager?’ in Rhodes, C. (ed.) The European Union in the World 
Community (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
Asciutti, E. (2010) ‘The ASEAN Charter: An Analysis’, in Perspectives on Federalism, vol. 
2, no.1. 
ASEAN (2003) Declaration of ASEAN Concord II <http://www.asean.org/15159.htm> 
(accessed 22 October 2011).  
ASEAN (2006) ASEAN Bulletin <http://www.asean.org/18992.htm> (accessed 14 November 
2011). 
ASEAN (2007a) Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and the UN on ASEAN-
UN Cooperation < http://www.asean.org/21918.pdf> (accessed 14 November 2011). 
ASEAN (2007b) Media Release – ASEAN Leaders Sign ASEAN Charter, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/21085.htm> (accessed 1 December 2011). 
 27
ASEAN (2007c) The ASEAN Charter, <http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-
Charter.pdf > (accessed 23 June 2011). 
ASEAN (2009) The ASEAN Secretariat <http://www.aseansec.org/22467.htm> (accessed 13 
November 2011). 
ASEAN (2010) ASEAN Co-Chair’s Statement of the Third ASEAN-UN Summit 
<http://www.asean.org/25496.htm> (accessed 14 November 2011). 
Ba, A.D. (2009) ‘Regionalism’s Multiple Negotiations: ASEAN in East Asia’, in Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 22, no. 3. 
Bellamy, A.J. (2004) ‘The Pursuit of Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond Realism’, in 
Beeson, M. (ed.) Contemporary Southeast Asia - Regional Dynamics, National 
Differences (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Blavoukos, S. and Bourantonis, D. (2011) ‘The EU’s Performance at the United Nations 
Security Council’, in Journal of European Integration, vol. 33, no. 6. 
Börzel, T.A. and Risse, T. (2009) Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism – The EU as a Model of 
Regional Integration, KFG Working Paper no. 7, Kolleg-Forschergruppe ‘The 
Transformative Power of Europe’, <http://www.polsoz.fu-
berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_07_Boerzel_Risse.p
df> (accessed 2 December 2010).  
Breslin, S. (2010) ‘The EU and Asia Within an Evolving Global Order: What is Europe? 
Where is Asia?’, in East Asia, vol. 27. 
Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (1999) The European Union as a Global Actor (London: 
Routledge). 
Caballero-Anthony, M. (2003) ‘Regionalisation of Peace in Asia_ experiences and Prospects 
of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership’, Working Paper no 42, Institute of Defence and 
Strategic Studies Singapore.  
 28
Caballero-Anthony, M. (2009) ‘Evolving Regional Governance in East Asia: from ASEAN 
to an East Asian Community’, in Thomas, N. (ed.) Governance and Regionalism in 
Asia, (Oxon: Routledge). 
Capie, D. (2010) ‘When Does Track Two Matter? Structure, Agency and Asian 
Regionalism’, in Review of International Political Economy, vol. 17, no. 2. 
Davidson, P.J. (2009) ‘The Role of Law in Governing Regionalism in Asia’, in Thomas, N. 
(ed.) Governance and Regionalism in Asia (Oxon: Routledge). 
De Prado, C. (2007) Global Multilevel Governance: European and East Asian Leadership 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press).  
De Prado, C. (2010) ‘Regions in the World: The EU and East Asia as Foreign Policy Actors’, 
in International Politics, vol. 47, no. 3/ 4. 
Doidge, M. (2008) ‘Regional Organizations as Actors in International Relations: 
Interregionalism and Asymmetric Dialogues’, in Rüland, J., Schubert, G., Schucher, 
G and Storz, C. (eds.) Asian-European Relations: Building Blocs for Global 
Governance? (Oxon: Routledge).  
ESCAP (2008) Striving Together: ASEAN & the UN (Bangkok: UN Publication). 
Farrell, M. (2006) ‘EU Representation and Coordination with the United Nations’, in 
Laatikainen, K.V. and Smith, K.E. (eds.) The European Union at the United Nations: 
Intersecting Multilateralisms (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Freistein, K. (2005) ‘ASEAN after the Bali Summit 2003: From Paralysis to New Life?’, in 
European Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 4, no. 2. 
Freistein, K. (2008) ‘Beyond the Taboos? – The Opportunities and Limitations of Asian-
Europe Track-Two Dialogue’ in Rüland, J., Schubert, G., Schucher, G and Storz, C. 
(eds.) Asian-European Relations: Building Blocs for Global Governance? (Oxon: 
Routledge). 
 29
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity: Self and Society in the Later Modern 
Age (Cambridge: Polity). 
Haacke, J. (2003) ASEAN’s Quiet Diplomatic and Security Culture – Origins, Development 
and Prospects (London: Routledge). 
Held, D. (1997) Democracy and Globalization, MPIfG Working Paper 97/ 5 
<http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-5/wp97-5.html> (accessed 2 
September 2011). 
Held, D. and McGrew, A. (2002) ‘The Great Globalization Debate’, in Held, D. and 
McGrew, A. (eds.) The Global Transformations Reader – An Introduction to the 
Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity). 
Held, D. and McGrew, A. (2007) ‘Introduction’, in Held, D. and McGrew, A. (eds.) 
Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Polity).  
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999) Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity). 
Henderson, J. (1999) Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper 328, IISS: London). 
Herrberg, A. (1997) ‘The European Union in its International Environment: A Systematic 
Analysis’, in Landau, A. and Whitman, R.C. (eds.) Rethinking the EU -Institutions, 
Interests and Identities (London: Macmillan). 
Hettne, B. (1996) ‘Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia’, in Tanaka, T. and 
Inoguchi, T. (eds.) Globalism and Regionalism (Tokyo: United Nations University), 
<www.unu.edu/unupress/globalism.html>  (accessed 9 August 2010). 
Hettne, B. (2003) ‘The New Regionalism Revisited’, in Söderbaum, F. and Shaw, T.M. 
(eds.), Theories of New Regionalisms: A Palgrave Reader (Basingstoke: Palgrave).  
 30
Hettne, B. (2007) ‘Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models’, in 
Telò, M. (ed.) European Union and New Regionalism (Aldershot: Ashgate). 
Hettne, B. (2010) ‘EU Foreign Policy: The Interregional Model’, in Söderbaum, F. and 
Stålgren, P. (eds.) The European Union and the Global South (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner). 
Hettne, B. (2011) ‘The European Union as an Emerging Global Actor’, in Wunderlich, J.-U. 
and Bailey, D.J. (eds.) The European Union and Global Governance – A Handbook 
(London: Routledge). 
Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F. (2002) ‘Theorizing the Rise of Regioness’, in Breslin, S., 
Hughes, C.W., Phillips, N. and Rosamond, B. (eds.) New Regionalism and the Global 
Political Economy: Theories and Cases (London: Routledge). 
Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F. (2006) ‘The UN and Regional Organizations in Global 
Security: Competing or Complementary Logics?’, in Global Governance, vol. 12. 
Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F. (2008) ‘The Future of Regionalism: Old Divides, New 
Frontiers’, in: Cooper, A, Hughes, C. and De Lombaerde, P. (eds.) Regionalisation 
and Global Governance – The Taming of Globalisation (London: Routledge). 
Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International 
Role’ in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, n. 3. 
Hill, C. (1998) ‘Closing the Capability-Expectations Gap?’, in Petersen, J. and Sjursen, H. 
(eds.) A Common Foreign and Security Policy for Europe? Competing Visions for the 
CFSP (London: Routledge).  
Hill, C. and Smith, M. (2005) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
 31
Jørgensen, K.E., Oberthür, S. and Shahin (2011) ‘Introduction: Assessing the EU’s 
Performance in International Institutions –Conceptual Framework and Core 
Findings’, in Journal of European Integration, vol. 33, no. 6. 
Jupille, J. and Caporaso (1998) ‘ States, Agency and Rules: The EU in Global Environmental 
Politics’, in Rhodes, C. (ed.) The European Union in the World Community (London: 
Lynne Rienner). 
Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) Regionalism in Comparative Perspective, Arena Working Paper, WP 
96/1 <http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers1996/wp96_1.htm> (accessed 5 
December 2011). 
Keohane, R. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).  
Khoo, H. (2000) ‘ASEAN as a “Neighbourhood Watch Group”’, in Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, vol. 22, no. 2.  
Kim, N.-K. (2009) ‘European Experience for East Asian Integration: Ideas, National 
Interests, and the International Circumstance’, in Asia Europe Journal, vol. 7. 
Kivimäki, T. (2008) ‘Power, Interest or Culture – Is there a Paradigm that Explains ASEAN’s 
political role best?’, in The Pacific Review, vol. 21, no. 4. 
Kjær, A.M. (2004) Governance (Cambridge: Polity). 
Koenig-Archibugi (2007) ‘Mapping Global Governance’, in Held, D. and McGrew, A. (eds.) 
Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Polity).  
Koutrakou, V.N. (2011) ‘European Union – United Nations Cooperation in Conflict and 
Development’, in Wunderlich, J.-U. and Bailey, D.J. (eds.) The European Union and 
Global Governance: A Handbook (London: Routledge).   
 32
Krasner, S.D. (1983) International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Kurus, B. (1994) ‘The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking and Economic 
Cooperation’, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 16, no. 4. 
Laatikainen, K.V. and Smith, K.E. (2006) The European Union at the United Nations: 
Intersecting Multilateralisms (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Lister, F.K. (1984) Decision-Making Strategies for International Organisations: The IMF 
Model (Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver). 
Loder, J., Montsion, J.M. and Stubbs, R. (2011) ‘East Asian Regionalism and the European 
Experience’, in Warleigh-Lack, A., Robinson, N. and Rosamond, B. (eds.) New 
Regionalism and the European Union – Dialogues, Comparisons and New research 
Directions (Oxon: Routledge). 
Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, in Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2. 
McGrew, A. (2007) ‘Globalization in Hard Times: Contention in the Academy and Beyond’, 
in Ritzer, G. (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Globalization (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Morada, N.M. (2008) ‘ASEAN at 40: Prospects for Community Building in Southeast Asia’, 
in Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 15, no. 1. 
Narine, S. (2008) ‘Forty Years of ASEAN: A Historical Review’, in The Pacific Review, vol. 
21, no. 4. 
Nischalke, T.I. (2002) ‘Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post-Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea 
of Regional Community’, in The Pacific Review, vol. 15, no.1. 
Official Journal of the European Union (2010a) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, C83/47 < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF>  
(accessed 5 December 2011). 
 33
Official Journal of the European Union (2010b) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union, C83/13 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF> 
(accessed 30 November 2011). 
Pardo, R.P. (2009) ‘The Political Weakness of the EU in East Asia: A Constructivist 
Approach’, in Asia Europe Journal, vol. 7. 
Peou, S. (1998) ‘The Subsidiarity Model of Global Governance in the UN-ASEAN Context’, 
in Global Governance, vol. 4. 
Pierson, P. (1998) ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis’, 
in Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (eds.) European Integration and Supranational 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Rittberger, V. and Zangl, B. with Staisch, M. (2006) International Organization: Polity, 
Politics and Policies (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Ritzer, G. (2007) ‘Introduction’, in Ritzer, G. (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to 
Globalization (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Rosenau, J.N. (2003) Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization (Princeton, N.J.:  
Princeton University Press). 
Rosenau, J.N. (2005) ‘Global Governance as disaggregated Complexity’, in: Ba, A.D and 
Hoffmann, M.J. (eds.) Contending Perspectives on Global Governance – Coherence, 
Contestation and World Order (Oxon: Routledge). 
Rosenau, J.N. and Czempiel, O. (1992) Governance without Government: Order and Change 
in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Rüland, J. (2011) ‘Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: “Multilateral 
Utility” or “Hedging Utility”?’ in Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 33, no.1. 
Scholte, J.A. (2000) Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2000). 
 34
Sjöstedt, G. (1977) The External Role of the European Community (Farnborough: Saxon 
House). 
Smith, M. (1996) ‘The EU as an International Actor’, in Richardson, J. (ed.), European 
Union: Power and Policy-Making (London: Routledge). 
Söderbaum, F. and Sbragia, A (2010) ‘EU Studies and the ‘New Regionalism’: What can be 
Gained from Dialogue’, in Journal of European Integration, vol. 32, no. 6. 
Stubbs, R. (2008) ‘The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutions and the Challenge of 
“Global” Governance’, in Pacific Affairs, vol. 21, no. 4. 
Sukma, R. (1999) ‘Security and Interdependence in Southeast Asia – A View from Jakarta’, 
in Strategi, vo. 7. 
Taylor, P. (2006) ‘The EU in Geneva: Coordinating Policy in the Economic and Social 
Arrangements of the United Nations System’, in Laatikainen, K.V. and Smith, K.E. 
(2006) The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Telò, M. (2005) European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actor and Global 
Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era (Aldershot: Ashgate).  
Telò, M. (2009) The European Union and Global Governance (Oxon: Routledge). 
Thakur, R. and Van Langenhove, L. (2006) ‘Enhancing Global Governance through Regional 
Integration’, in Global Governance, vol. 12. 
Thakur, R. and Van Langenhove, L. (2008) ‘Enhancing Global Governance through Regional 
Integration’, in Cooper, A., Hughes, C.W. and De Lombaerde, P. (eds.) 
Regionalisation and Global Governance: The Taming of Globalisation? (Oxon: 
Routledge). 
United Nations Charter of the United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml> (accessed 1 December 2011). 
 35
United Nations General Assembly (1995) Declaration of the Enhancement of Cooperation 
between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, A/RES/49/57, 17 February 1995 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20SRES%2049%2057.pdf> (accessed 15 September 
2011). 
United Nations General Assembly (2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 24 
October 2005 <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20ARES%2060%201.pdf> (accessed 15 
September 2011). 
United Nations General Assembly (2006) Observer Status for the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations in the General Assembly, A/RES/61/44, 18 December 2006 
<http://www.aseansec.org/18992-2.pdf> (accessed 24 September 2011). 
United Nations General Assembly (2011) General Assembly, in Recorded vote, Adopts 
Resolution Granting European Union Right of Reply, Ability to Present Oral 
Amendments, GA/11079/Rev.1, 3 May 2011 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ga11079.doc.htm> (accessed 16 
September 2011). 
United Nations General Secretary (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> (accessed 15 September 2011). 
United Nations Secretary General (2005) Conclusions of the Chairman of the Sixth High-
Level Meeting between the United Nations and Regional and other Intergovernmental 
Organizations, A/60/341, S2005/567, 25/ 26 July 2005 
 36
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20S2005%20567.pdf> (accessed 15 September 2011). 
United Nations Security Council (2005) Resolution 1631 (2005), S/RES/1631, 17 October 
2005 <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNRO%20SRES%201631.pdf> (accessed 15 September 
2011). 
United Nations Security Council (2010) 6257th Meeting, S/PV/6257, 13 January 2010 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20SPV%206257.pdf>  (accessed 15 September 2011). 
Van Langenhove, L. (2011) Building Regions: The Regionalization of the World Order 
(Farnham: Ashgate). 
Weatherbee, D. (2005) International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy 
(London: Rowman and Littlefield). 
Whitman, R.G (1998) From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the 
EU (London: Macmillian). 
Wunderlich (2007) Regionalism, Globalisation and International Order, Europe and 
Southeast Asia (Aldershot: Ashgate). 
Wunderlich, J.-U. and Bailey, D.J. (2011) The European Union and Global Governance – A 
Handbook (London: Routledge). 
Young, O.R. (1989) International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and 
the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).  
Young, O.R. (1999) Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Young, O.R. (2005) ‘Regime Theory and the Quest for Global Governance’, in: Ba, A.D and 
Hoffmann, M.J. (eds.) Contending Perspectives on Global Governance – Coherence, 
Contestation and World Order (Oxon: Routledge). 
 37
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
